New ceasefire model, or new political trap?

Burma’s State Peace and Solidarity Development Council has been under mounting internal and international pressure to move towards political reform, meaningful dialogue and genuine national reconciliation. Just over one year ago, September 2007 saw the Saffron Revolution, Burma’s largest anti-government protests in two decades. And the regime has faced mounting international pressure over its mishandling of Cyclone Nargis as well as an atrocious human rights record; less than four days ago, the United Nations approved a draft resolution condemning rights violations by the military government.

The regime, however, refuses to change course and continues to move its political agenda towards elections in 2010. However, before the 2010 elections, the regime has to solve a political problem: it has to deal with 15 ethnic ceasefire groups. It needs to handle these groups carefully. If it does not, ethnic armed group may break their ceasefire agreements and civil war may begin again.

How will the SPDC handle these ceasefire groups? Its primary aim is to consolidate all armed groups under the command of the Burmese Army. If the SPDC pressures the ceasefire groups to surrender their arms, many of them will refuse and revolt against the regime. Another protracted civil war will arise.

Now, the regime is developing a new model of ceasefire, and it has proposed it to some ethnic ceasefire groups in northern part of Burma, especially those based in Special Regions in Shan State. Gen. Ye Myint from Ministry of Defense traveled and met with the ceasefire leaders from Mong La (northern Shan State) region in early November and discussed the proposal for new ceasefire model. Gen. Ye Myint encouraged the ethnic leaders to get involved in elections. In return, the ceasefire groups need agree to reconstruction or reform of their armed forces. But Gen. Ye Myint said he did not need the ethnic armed groups to surrender to the Burmese Army.

The SPDC’s new strategy is to divide the ceasefire groups’ political leaders from their established armed forces. In the elections, SPDC will help to manipulate the balloting so those ethnic leaders get winning votes and become representatives in their areas. More business opportunities will also be available for them. But their authority over the armed forces will be reduced. After the reconstruction of armed forces, ethnic armed groups will be allowed to form paramilitary groups active under the command of Burmese Army Regional Commands. Some armed groups will also be made Border Guards.

The politically motivated ceasefire groups are concerned about the new proposed ceasefire model. Although the model would not involve laying down their arms, ethnic leaders and armed force risk being split after the 2010 elections. However, if the regime does not carefully handle this new model of ceasefire, civil war will again break out in some parts of Burma.